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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2013 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of (now-
Judge) William Fletcher’s The Structure of Standing, which recast 
standing as a question of substantive merits and of the underlying 
substantive cause of action, leaving Congress with “essentially 
unlimited” power to create new statutory rights and empower 
individuals to enforce those rights in federal court.1 
Two years later, the Supreme Court’s pending review of the 
Ninth Circuit in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins offers a new opportunity to 
consider the benefits of Fletcherian standing, in the context of a 
particular statutory dispute.2  I hold no illusions that the Court will do 
this, of course. The Court has only moved further away from Fletcher’s 
model in the twenty-five years since his landmark article. This Essay 
ultimately may be an exercise in wishful procedural and jurisdictional 
thinking. 
On the other hand, a major project for the Roberts Court, 
which I have discussed in previous work, has been the elimination of 
 
 *  Professor of Law, FIU College of Law. Thanks to Suzanna Sherry and the members of 
Vanderbilt Law Review for the invitation to participate in this roundtable. 
 1.  William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988). 
 2.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 
(2015). 
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“drive-by jurisdictional rulings,” decisions marked by “profligate” and 
“less than meticulous” use of the word jurisdictional and the concept of 
jurisdiction.3 The Court has corrected course by repeatedly declaring 
to be merits issues a host of other doctrines previously, albeit wrongly, 
associated with federal adjudicative jurisdiction. The time is right for 
the Court to do the same with issues wrongly associated with 
standing. 
The remainder of this Essay shows how Spokeo illustrates the 
wisdom of Fletcher’s merits-based model of standing. His approach is 
consistent with other pieces of the Court’s recent jurisdictionality 
jurisprudence and offers a normatively preferable way to determine 
who is entitled to sue in federal court to vindicate legal rights created 
by Congress. 
II.  FLETCHERIAN STANDING REVISITED 
In highly abbreviated form, Fletcher proposes that courts 
“abandon the idea that standing is a preliminary jurisdictional issue,” 
understanding it instead as simply “a question on the merits of 
plaintiff’s claim.”4 The lynchpin of Fletcher’s argument is his 
insistence that there is no such thing as an objective, neutral injury in 
fact divorced from some external, normative source of law establishing 
rights and duties and defining when someone has been injured.5 The 
relevant question is not whether an actual injury occurred, but 
whether it is an injury that the courts should recognize; that, in turn, 
depends on the substantive right sought to be vindicated and enforced 
in a particular case.6 To illustrate, the meaningful difference between 
a person losing sleep because the government is not taking sufficient 
steps to eliminate homelessness and a person losing sleep because his 
neighbor’s dog is barking is that applicable substantive law recognizes 
the latter, but not the former, as a remediable injury.7 
This view has its most significant implications in cases 
involving statutory (as opposed to constitutional) rights. Congress has 
power to create legal rights and duties by statute (within the bounds 
 
 3.  Howard M. Wasserman, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, and the 
Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 308 (2012) [hereinafter Wasserman, 
Ministerial]; Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings”, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 947, 947–48 (2011) [hereinafter Wasserman, Drive-By]; see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 
546 U.S. 500, 510–11 (2006). 
 4.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 223. 
 5.  Id. at 231. 
 6.  Id. at 231–32, 234. 
 7.  See id. at 232. 
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of Article I, Section 8; Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; or 
some other source of legislative power). An essential incident of that 
power to create rights and duties is unfettered authority to define the 
class of persons entitled to enforce those rights and duties.8 It is 
incoherent for a court to say that a plaintiff who is entitled to sue 
under a statute has nevertheless not suffered an injury in fact; the 
statute itself provides the normative structure that defines the 
injury.9 Thus, the sole focus should be on identifying the specific 
statutory duty Congress created and determining whom Congress 
intended to authorize as enforcers of that duty. 
Fletcher recognizes an essential identity between statutory 
standing and implied rights of action, both being about the right of a 
plaintiff to initiate private litigation to enforce and vindicate a 
congressionally created right.10 As to either, Fletcher argues, “the 
important point to notice is that the question of whether plaintiff 
‘stands’ in a position to enforce defendant’s duty is part of the merits 
of the plaintiff’s claim.”11 
Indeed, for courts to deny standing in such statutory actions 
undermines the notion that separation of powers forms the “single 
basic idea” underlying standing doctrine.12 It allows courts to act in 
derogation of otherwise-proper congressional power to confer a legal 
right on some plaintiffs. For the Court to hold that a grant of standing 
to enforce a statutory duty violates Article III is for the Court to fail to 
“defer[ ] to the exercise of power by our democratically elected 
legislative body,” thereby “restraining Congress’s power and 
increasing its own.”13 
Jonathan Siegel elaborates on this point. Imposing an Article 
III overlay onto statutory causes of action disables Congress from 
imposing truly mandatory requirements;14 Congress can purport to 
create legal duties, but is limited in its power to create a regime in 
which the public can enforce those duties where the statutory injury is 
generally dispersed.15 The beneficiary of such a system is the 
President, who now wields near-exclusive power to determine the 
 
 8.  Id. at 223–24, 254. 
 9.  See id. at 254. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 239. 
 12.  See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). 
 13.  William A. Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
277, 282 (2013); see Fletcher, supra note 1, at 254. 
 14.  Jonathan R. Siegel, What if the Universal Injury-in-Fact Test Already is Normative?, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 403, 413–15 (2013). 
 15.  Id. 
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appropriate level of statutory enforcement.16 Congress has been 
stripped of any power to create a regime in which the public can 
demand an appropriate degree of enforcement by allowing private 
individuals to supplement government enforcement through the 
courts. 
Two other commentators have recognized the appeal of 
Fletcher’s pure-merits approach to standing, while arguing for some 
limits on the approach, particularly as it affects Congress’ power to 
establish statutory standing. 
First, Robert Pushaw argues that courts should not give total 
deference to statutory standing grants, but only accord them a “strong 
presumption of validity.”17 That presumption is overcome “most 
starkly” where a statute permits “any person” to sue for violations, 
“regardless of whether that person has suffered a fortuitous invasion 
of legal rights.”18 Pushaw also singles out situations in which 
“ideologically driven plaintiffs” insist they have been adversely 
affected by broad agency action.19 He is particularly concerned that 
Fletcher’s theory leaves no limits on ideological suits, such as by 
environmental advocacy groups against federal officials over their 
unlawful or insufficient enforcement of federal environmental laws.20 
Second, Ernest Young agrees with Fletcher that standing 
cannot be divorced from the underlying law at issue. But Young 
argues that courts must deal with the many statutes in which 
Congress has not made its intent known with respect to who is 
entitled to sue. In such cases, default rules are necessary to resolve 
the question when “Congress will simply not have considered—or 
simply failed to reach closure on—the question who can sue to enforce 
a particular statutory scheme.”21 And, Young insists, those default 
rules look very much like the general, freestanding, non-merits-based 
standing principles that Fletcher decries.22 
 
 16.  Id. at 415. 
 17.  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The 
Structure of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 332 (2013). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletcher--And General Standing Principles, 65 
ALA. L. REV. 473, 481 (2013). 
 22.  See id. at 475. 
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III. JURISDICTION, STANDING, AND MERITS 
A. Distinguishing Merits from Jurisdiction 
One of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudential projects has been 
elimination of “drive-by jurisdictional rulings”—that is, rulings 
employing the jurisdictional label in a “profligate” or “less than 
meticulous” way without considering the meaning or effect of that 
label.23 The Court has drawn properly sharp lines between federal 
district courts’ “arising under” federal-question jurisdiction and the 
substantive merits of federal claims by broadening what issues 
establish the merits of a claim and narrowing what issues function as 
limitations on a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Merits fundamentally ask who is entitled to sue whom, for 
what conduct, and for what remedy.24 A plaintiff prevails on her claim 
when applicable substantive law permits that person to sue this 
defendant for this real-world conduct and entitles her to this remedy.25 
Recent decisions establish that the scope and reach of a federal 
statute—what conduct it reaches or prohibits, by whom, and for whose 
benefit—is a merits question.26 Merits remain distinct from a court’s 
adjudicative jurisdiction, its root power or authority to provide an 
adjudicative forum for resolving claims of right and to hear and 
resolve the legal and factual issues raised under applicable 
substantive law.27 
The Court has attempted to be unequivocal about this divide. 
Whether a company qualifies as an employer subject to Title VII 
liability is a question of substantive merits, not adjudicative 
jurisdiction.28 So is whether a non-U.S. defendant can be liable under 
federal securities law for non-U.S. conduct.29 The merits 
characterization also applies to whether a particular individual is 
entitled to sue under a statute—for example, whether a plaintiff 
qualifies as a ministerial employee so as to fall within the “ministerial 
 
 23.  Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 3; see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510–11 
(2006). 
 24.  John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 
GEO. L.J. 2513, 2515 (1998); Wasserman, Ministerial, supra note 3, at 296 (quoting Harrison, 
supra); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 
227, 236 (2008) (citing Harrison, supra). 
 25.  Wasserman, Ministerial, supra note 3, at 296; Wasserman, supra note 24, at 236. 
 26.  See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010). 
 27.  Wasserman, Ministerial, supra note 3, at 302; Wasserman, Drive-By, supra note 3, at 
948; Wasserman, supra note 24, at 261; see Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254. 
 28.  Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515–16. 
 29.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253–54. 
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exemption” from federal employment discrimination laws30 or whether 
a plaintiff is an independent contractor not subject to those laws.31 
The effect of this trend is that it is more likely that a court will 
be deemed to have authority to adjudicate a case so long as it appears 
that the plaintiff asserts a legal right created by or existing because of 
federal law. Other limitations that might defeat the claim become 
matters of when the plaintiff can or should prevail under the legal 
rules that Congress (or the Constitution) has established.32 
That question is analyzed in three different ways at three 
different points in the litigation process. First is on a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6); the court limits its inquiry to the four corners of 
the plaintiff’s complaint, accepts non-conclusory factual allegations as 
true, and asks whether the plaintiff has pled a plausible claim for 
recovery under substantive law.33 The second point involves a motion 
for summary judgment; the court considers evidence produced in 
discovery and, drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party, 
determines whether there are genuine disputes as to the material 
facts that plaintiff must show to prevail on her claim.34 The final point 
is at trial on the merits before a factfinder empowered to resolve 
factual disputes and to decide whether the defendant breached its 
duties or violated plaintiff’s rights and, if so, the appropriate remedy.35 
The Court’s new effort to cleanly divide merits from subject-
matter jurisdiction calls into question the longstanding-but-dubious 
rule of Bell v. Hood. Under Bell, it is “well settled that the failure to 
state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and 
not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.”36 But Bell acknowledged, 
and retained, “previously carved out exceptions” characterizing certain 
dismissals as jurisdictional where “the alleged claim under the 
Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and 
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a 
claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”37 Bell creates an 
erroneous blending of jurisdiction and merits, in which jurisdiction 
 
 30.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709–10 n.4 (2012). 
 31.  Anyan v. Nelson, 68 F. App’x 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order). 
 32.  Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 698 (2005). 
 33.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2007). 
 34.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). 
 35.  Wasserman, supra note 32, at 653–55. 
 36.  Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). 
 37.  Id. at 682–83. 
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turns on the strength of the claim.38 Even if Bell strips jurisdiction 
only in cases of extraordinarily weak claims and even if it rarely forms 
the basis for a jurisdictional dismissal, it still imposes an unnecessary 
and confusing overlap between the concepts. 39 The Court itself has 
questioned Bell, calling it “a maxim more ancient than analytically 
sound.”40 It certainly has never explained how a claim that seeks 
recovery for a violation of rights created by federal law can become so 
weak as to not arise under federal law. 
The incoherence of Bell figures into Fletcher’s critique of 
standing. Just as Bell improperly recasts merits as jurisdiction, so 
does standing recast merits as a threshold jurisdictional issue. We 
could discard Bell and require that all objections to the sufficiency of a 
plaintiff’s legal argument be raised on a 12(b)(6) motion41 or, later in 
the process, on a motion for summary judgment. And we similarly 
could discard standing as a constitutional threshold and require that 
all objections to the plaintiff’s right to sue be raised and resolved on a 
12(b)(6) or summary judgment motion. 
Unfortunately, while properly holding that the failure of an 
element of a Title VII claim did not affect the district court’s 
jurisdiction, the Court in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.42 missed an 
opportunity to jettison Bell, even while recognizing it as flawed. In 
citing Bell while drawing otherwise sharp divisions between subject 
matter jurisdiction and substantive merits,43 the Court at least 
retained the possibility of a jurisdictional dismissal of an especially 
weak claim, leaving a roadblock to the necessary clean divide between 
the concepts.44 On the other hand, the Court did not cite Arbaugh or 
Bell for the insubstantiality point in two subsequent cases rejecting 
jurisdictional characterizations of statutory elements.45 Although the 
Court addressed the issue only in passing in both cases, the silence 
perhaps reflects further distancing from this troubling jurisdiction-
merits overlap. 
 
 38.  Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV. 579, 
590–91 (2007).  
 39.  See id. at 586; Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1011–
12 (2006). 
 40.  Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 
(1974); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 235. 
 41.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 235. 
 42.  546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 43.  Id. at 501 & n.10. 
 44.  Wasserman, supra note 38, at 584. 
 45.  See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709–10 n.4 (2012); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 254 
(2010). 
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The important point is that the Court has become increasingly 
inclined to characterize statutory factual issues as merits and to 
abandon any understanding of those issues as connected to a court’s 
adjudicative authority. Put differently, the Court has become 
increasingly inclined to treat appropriate factual issues as part of the 
underlying claim rather than as part of the Article III threshold. 
B. Distinguishing Merits from Standing 
If more legal issues are treated as merits rather than the 
Article III subject-matter jurisdiction threshold, it makes sense to do 
the same with the merits as compared with the Article III standing 
threshold. Like statutory facts such as whether the defendant 
qualifies as an employer or whether the plaintiff is a person protected 
by the statute, the elements of standing—injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability46—go to who can sue whom for what conduct and what 
remedy. If that question goes to the underlying merits in the context 
of subject-matter jurisdiction, it also should go to the merits in the 
context of standing. 
Unfortunately, the Court has been less ready to acknowledge 
standing as erroneously constitutionalized merits to the same extent it 
has with adjudicative jurisdiction. Several significant standing 
decisions from the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts involved challenges 
to the constitutionality of grants of statutory standing, with the Court 
usually concluding that the grant violated Article III.47 These cases 
acknowledge that Congress may create new statutory rights, define 
new injuries, establish new chains of causation, and even “elevat[e] to 
the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that 
were previously inadequate in law.”48 But Article III limits that power 
in that, regardless of what the statute requires or allows, the plaintiff 
must also show an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized 
and actual and imminent.49 While the Court leaves some room for 
congressional creativity (and Justice Kennedy appears to leave even 
greater room50), it is far from the plenary power that Fletcher urges. 
 
 46.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 47.  Summers v. Island Trees Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109–10 (1998); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. But see Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
 48.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578. 
 49.  Id.. 
 50.  Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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The one case running in the opposite direction is 2014’s 
Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., which 
at least feinted toward removing the standing label from some 
concepts better understood as going to the substantive merits of a 
claim.51 Static manufactured components that businesses used to 
refurbish Lexmark’s toner cartridges, a practice Lexmark sought to 
discourage by sending letters containing allegedly false statements to 
some of the companies that did business with Static, although not to 
Static itself.52 Static nevertheless brought counterclaims under a 
provision of the Lanham Act establishing liability for false or 
deceptive statements and providing a cause of action for “any person 
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by” the 
defendant’s statements.53 The question was presented to the Court as 
whether Static had “prudential standing” to bring the case, specifically 
whether it fell within the “zone of interest” of, or had “statutory 
standing” under, the Lanham Act. 
For our purposes, the Court rejected the standing label and 
characterized these issues as going to the substantive merits of 
Static’s counterclaim. The zone of interest test requires the Court “to 
determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, whether 
a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular 
plaintiff’s claim”—that is, whether this plaintiff falls within the class 
“whom Congress has authorized to sue.”54 Stated still differently, the 
Court “asks whether Static Control has a cause of action under the 
statute,” a question of substantive merits, not a question of standing 
or jurisdiction.55 Lexmark further recognized that the alternative label 
“statutory standing” was no less misleading, as it still used “standing” 
to capture whether a party has a valid cause of action.56 
The Court recognized, in other words, that the fundamental 
question of statutory standing—who can sue, for what conduct, and for 
what remedy under the statute—is properly a question of merits. This 
new conception matches Fletcher’s argument that standing is merits—
the Court all along has actually been using these concepts to 
“determine[ ] whether a plaintiff has a federal cause of action.”57 It 
also matches more recent arguments from Radha Pathak that the 
alternative term statutory standing is merely “shorthand for the 
 
 51.  134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 52.  Id. at 1383–84. 
 53.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 54.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 & n.3. 
 55.  Id. at 1387. 
 56.  Id. at 1388 n.4. 
 57.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 252. 
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familiar rule that a plaintiff cannot recover unless the plaintiff is 
within the class of persons to whom Congress has conferred a private 
right of action.”58 
Having thus recharacterized prudential standing, Lexmark was 
left to determine the merits of Static’s claim—whether Static’s 
allegations showed that it was entitled to sue under the Act, 
considering the scope of the statute and its incorporation of proximate 
cause.59 Critically, the Court analyzed this as on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, accepting the allegations as true and asking whether the 
complaint contained sufficient facts to plausibly show causation.60 
Lexmark’s effect is perhaps limited because it involved 
purported prudential or statutory limitations on a claim, not the 
Article III limits on the rights and enforcement mechanisms Congress 
can create. There was also no suggestion that Static had not suffered 
an injury in fact, given its allegations of lost sales and loss of business 
reputation.61 Justice Scalia—who wrote for the Court in both Lexmark 
and 1998’s Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment—willingly 
concedes that, while whether the plaintiffs falls within the scope of the 
statute is a merits question, whether that plaintiff has suffered an 
Article III injury in fact remains a distinct, non-merits threshold 
question.62 In this respect, Scalia remains Fletcher’s sharpest 
interlocutor and the justice least likely to accept the fundamentally 
merits-based, and congressionally dictated, nature of whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to sue under a statute.63 
IV. A FLETCHERIAN MERITS APPROACH TO SPOKEO 
Spokeo shows Fletcher’s arguments in action and where they 
should lead doctrinally, producing not only a better result, but also a 
more sensible explanation and justification for that result.64 The case 
involves claims under a provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”) establishing a private right of action for “any consumer” to 
recover for “willful” violations of the Act by a credit-reporting agency,65 
 
 58.  Radha Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 106 
(2009). 
 59.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct at 1388. 
 60.  Id. at 1393–94 & n.6. 
 61.  Id. at 1384, 1386. 
 62.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). 
 63.  See Siegel, supra note 14, at 406–07. 
 64.  Fletcher, supra note 13, at 282–83 (“I no longer insist so vigorously that the Court 
explain what it is doing and why, and I no longer object so strenuously to the Court’s 
substituting its view for Congress’s.”). 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012). 
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such as failing to maintain “reasonable procedures” designed to avoid 
violations of the Act.66 A consumer-plaintiff can recover actual or 
statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees.67 An 
amicus brief from several privacy scholars describes the statute as 
reflecting a “careful bargain.”68 Congress insulated data collectors 
from liability if they establish appropriate procedures, while providing 
a private right of action with statutory damages as a meaningful 
deterrent for non-compliance.69 That remedy recognized the difficulty 
associated with “proving the extent of injury flowing from conduct in a 
marketplace whose detailed workings still remain largely invisible to 
consumers.”70 
Spokeo operates a web site providing in-depth reports about 
individuals; the reports present a vast range of information, including 
address, phone number, educational and work history, marital status, 
family relations, property values, and other facts.71 Thomas Robins 
sued Spokeo, alleging that his profile contained a picture that was not 
of him and inaccurately stated that he: had a graduate degree, was 
employed in a professional or technical field, enjoyed wealth in the 
“Top 10 %”, was in his 50s, was married, and had children.72 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court dismissal of the 
claim for lack of standing. The court rejected Spokeo’s argument that 
Robins’s claim must fail because he had not pled actual harm. Section 
1681n(a) does not require a showing of actual harm to recover on a 
willful violation; when a “statutory cause of action does not require 
proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the 
statutory right without suffering actual damages.”73 Turning to Article 
III, the court held that the statutory rights at issue were of the kind 
that, although previously inadequate, could be elevated by Congress to 
a legally cognizable injury.74 Agreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the court 
emphasized that Robins was enforcing his own statutory rights in the 
handling and presentation of his own personal information.75 
 
 66.  15 U.S.C. § 1681e  
 67.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). 
 68.  Brief of Amici Curiae Information Privacy Law Scholars in Support of Respondent at 4, 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (U.S. petition for cert. filed May 1, 2014). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 1892. 
 72.  Brief of Respondent, Spokeo, Inc., No. 13-339, at 8–9; see also Robins, 742 F.3d at 411 
(discussing Robins’s allegations below). 
 73.  Robins, 742 F.3d at 413. 
 74.  Id. at 413–14. 
 75.  Id. 
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Fletcher’s approach to standing makes this an easy case. 
Congress wields virtually limitless legislative power to decide which 
private individuals can sue to enforce their statutory rights and what 
remedies should be available for violations of those rights, power with 
which the Court should not interfere.76 Having created a specific 
statutory duty and provided remedies for its violation, Congress had 
unlimited power to authorize Robins to enforce that duty through 
private litigation in federal court. 
What remain to be resolved are the merits of Robins’s claim—
whether he has shown that Spokeo’s conduct violated his statutory 
rights. This, too, is relatively straightforward, at least at the pleading 
stage. As alleged, Robins is a consumer, Spokeo published consumer 
credit information about Robins, and that information was factually 
inaccurate. Robins further alleges that Spokeo failed to maintain 
appropriate procedures for ensuring accuracy and that its failure to do 
so (and the resulting inaccurate report) were willful.77 
Of course, it may be that Spokeo did maintain appropriate 
procedures or that the information was not materially inaccurate. In 
other words, Robins may not prevail on his claim. But the plaintiff’s 
ultimate success, based on a court’s actual resolution of those issues, 
goes to the substantive merits of whether Spokeo breached the duties 
that Congress imposed on it in the FCRA and its amendments. The 
court must answer that question at one or more of the three litigation 
points described above.78 But none of this should implicate a court’s 
threshold adjudicative power, whether we speak of that threshold as 
jurisdiction or standing. 
Fletcher’s model also offers the strongest rejoinder to Spokeo’s 
framing of the case before the Supreme Court. Spokeo argues 
repeatedly that Robins has only suffered an “injury-in-law,” in that his 
injury is a “mere” violation of the statute unaccompanied by any 
constitutionally required “real” injury in fact.79 But Fletcher’s 
fundamental insight is that all injuries are injuries in law, violations 
of legal interests derived from some external source; an injury is only 
judicially cognizable if some substantive law makes it an injury by 
creating a right and a remedy and granting someone the power to 
enforce that right and obtain that remedy in court.80 Robins’s injury is 
whatever Congress defined as an injury under the statute, which is 
 
 76.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 253; supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
 77.  Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Spokeo, Inc., No. 13-1339. 
77. Supra notes 33 – 35 and accompanying text. 
 79.  Brief for Petitioner at 33, 35, 40, Spokeo, Inc., No. 13-1339. 
 80.  Fletcher, supra note 1, at 231–32. 
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sufficient to allow Robins to pursue his claim. Under Fletcher’s model, 
the additional real-world injury that Spokeo demands, one divorced 
from the statute and the rights it creates, is both logically impossible 
and unnecessary. 
Even accepting that Congress’s power may be subject to some 
limitations in statutory cases, Spokeo presents none of the features 
justifying such limitations. Robins is attempting to enforce his own, 
singular, and personal statutory rights, not the rights of another 
person and not rights held in common or collectively with the 
undifferentiated public as a whole; Spokeo published false information 
about Robins and Robins is asserting his statutory rights not to have 
his information falsified. Even if the injury—that is, Spokeo’s alleged 
violation of Robins’s right not to have such false information 
published—would not exist as federal law but for the statute, it 
remains his particular injury. 
Robins is also acting to secure his own rights against another 
private party and to recover statutory damages available only to him. 
He is not seeking a remedy (such as a structural injunction) that 
would benefit the public at large, nor is he enforcing the law for 
broader public goals or to serve broader public purposes. In other 
words, he is not attempting to act as a “sort of private attorney 
general.”81 As William Rubenstein explains the difference, “when 
anyone pursues a deterrent remedy, particularly one with wide 
application, it feels as if they are doing something public, while when 
anyone pursues compensation, it feels as if they are doing something 
private.”82 To be sure, if a damages plaintiff (such as Robins) wins, a 
defendant (such as Spokeo) may feel compelled to change its practices 
to avoid liability to others in future suits. But this deterrent effect 
remains incidental to the lawsuit’s central goals of obtaining 
compensation for the plaintiff himself.83 Robins’s lawsuit differs from 
the type of statutory action that most often triggers standing concerns 
within the Court—environmental advocacy groups suing to enforce 
environmental-protection laws through potentially far-reaching 
injunctions against government officials.84 
Nor does Spokeo implicate the limitations on Fletcherian 
standing discussed previously.85 The case does not involve the type of 
 
 81.  Id. at 254. 
 82.  William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it Matters, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142 (2004). 
 83.  See id. at 2147. 
 84.  See supra note 47; see also Pushaw, supra note 17, at 304. 
 85.  Supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff or the type of injury that Pushaw criticizes.86 Section 
1681n(a) grants standing not to “any person,” but only to the 
“consumer” with respect to whose personal information the defendant 
engaged in a willful violation of the act.87 The consumer here, Robins, 
suffered a fortuitous invasion of his own rights—that is, Spokeo’s 
unexpected publication of inaccurate information about his personal 
and credit situations. Further, there is no indication that Robins is 
ideologically driven or that he sought out the statutory violation. 
Similarly, there are no gaps in the present statute that demand 
the standing-like default rules that Young describes.88 Section 
1681n(a) is unambiguous as to who can sue, who can be sued, for what 
conduct (violations of all the other provisions of the FCRA), and for 
what remedies. There should be nothing more for a court to do but 
apply that unambiguous provision to conclude that Robins and his 
claim, as alleged in the complaint, fall within the plain language of 
that section. All that remains is to determine the truth of those facts 
and thus the validity of that claim on the merits. But that occurs later 
in the litigation process, not at the adjudicative threshold. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the Supreme Court were going to adopt The Structure of 
Standing and recognize standing as being not a jurisdictional 
threshold but a piece of the substantive merits of the underlying 
statutory or constitutional claim, it would have done so a long time 
ago. Unfortunately, it has not. 
But recent doctrinal moves, in which the Court has recast both 
statutory standing and certain features of “arising under” subject-
matter jurisdiction as merits issues, reflect small steps in the right 
direction. As a relatively straightforward case involving an individual 
statutory right, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins offers the Court another 
opportunity to nudge the law another small step in that direction. We 
can only hope the Court seizes the opportunity.89 
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argument in Campbell-Ewald and arguing that mootness issues can be recharacterized in merits 
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